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The intraday determination of liquidity in the NYSE LIFFE equity option 
markets* 
Abstract: We exploit an extensive high frequency dataset of all individual equity options 
trading at NYSE LIFFE (Amsterdam, London and Paris) in order to study the determination 
of liquidity during the trading day. In particular, we focus on two main aspects of option 
liquidity: (i) the intraday behaviour of equity option liquidity and its determinants and (ii) the 
influence of macro-economic events and commonality on intraday equity option liquidity. 
Inventory management models cannot explain the intraday variation in option spreads and 
depths. Instead, we show that the option liquidity measures are strongly correlated with 
option volatility. Increases in volatility are associated with decreases in liquidity, a finding 
that is in line with information asymmetry models and the derivatives hedging theory. 
However, the relationship between spreads and volume varies across the three markets. 
Option liquidity reacts strongly to macroeconomic news announcements, especially US 
events. The average systematic liquidity component is 12% for Amsterdam, 14% for London 
and 16% for Paris.   
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1. Introduction 
The events of the financial crisis have highlighted the importance of understanding liquidity 
in financial markets. In equity markets, there is an extensive body of literature that 
investigates the microstructure of asset liquidity.1 However, for option markets, the literature 
on liquidity is very thin and to our knowledge there are no studies on the intraday 
determination of equity option liquidity.2 For the US options market, Wei and Zheng (2010) 
show that option volatility is the most important determinant of daily option liquidity, and 
Cao and Wei (2010) document strong liquidity commonality in daily data, even after 
controlling for the impact of the underlying market.  
In this paper, we seek to address a gap in the literature on equity option liquidity by providing 
an intraday analysis of an extensive high frequency dataset of all individual equity options 
trading at NYSE LIFFE Amsterdam, London and Paris. In particular, we focus on two main 
aspects of option liquidity: (i) the intraday behaviour of equity option liquidity and its 
determinants and (ii) the influence of macro-economic events and commonality on intraday 
equity option liquidity.  
Regarding the first aspect of the paper, we initially examine the extent to which inventory 
management models can explain the intraday behaviour of liquidity in the equity options 
market.  Importantly, while several studies present evidence of the intraday behaviour of 
                                                          
1 Several recent market microstructure studies investigate liquidity determination in the order book (Danielsson 
and Payne, 2012), the effect of the introduction of the electronic order book on liquidity (Gregoriou, 
forthcoming), commonality in liquidity (Dunne et al., 2011), liquidity and market making (Montalvo, 2003) and 
hidden liquidity (Pardo and Pascual, 2012).  
2 Earlier literature on the intraday patterns of equity option liquidity includes Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995), 
Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995) and George and Longstaff (1993).  
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liquidity measures in settings with specialist market makers, the only previous study on both 
spreads and depths for a competitive dealer market is by Frino et al. (2008) for the Sydney 
Futures Exchange (SFE).  These authors show that, in the context of changing financial 
market structures, more evidence is needed in order to conclude that inventories are driving 
trading costs in the setting of a competitive dealer market. We contribute new and different 
evidence to this debate. In contrast to Frino et al. (2008), we demonstrate that inventory 
management models cannot explain the intraday variation in option spreads and depths. We 
further study the determinants of intraday equity option liquidity, and show that the option 
liquidity measures are strongly correlated with option volatility. In contrast to the expected 
outcome if inventory risk were an important component of the bid-ask spread, increases in 
volume and volatility at the Amsterdam market are generally associated with decreases in 
liquidity. These findings are in line with information asymmetry models. However, for 
London and Paris, we find evidence to support both the information asymmetry and inventory 
management models. 
Relating to the sources of option liquidity, the literature is silent on the effect of 
macroeconomic news announcements on intraday option liquidity.3  Further, we use Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA) to identify the intraday pattern of systematic liquidity that may 
drive this relationship. We provide evidence that option liquidity reacts strongly to 
macroeconomic news announcements that are related to country-specific, European and US 
events. The average systematic liquidity component is 12% for Amsterdam, 14% for London 
and 16% for Paris. Systematic liquidity varies considerably during the trading day and is at its 
                                                          
3 In this respect, our study relates to the FX literature on intraday news announcements (see Dominguez and 
Panthaki, 2006). 
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highest level during the market open, levels off during the day but has two distinctive peaks 
at 13:30 and 15:00.  
With regard to the different aspects of liquidity discussed above, we contribute to the 
literature in a number of ways. This is the first paper to use such a comprehensive dataset of 
quotes and trades to study individual equity option liquidity. Our findings imply a clear need 
for richer models of intraday volatility to incorporate liquidity spill-over effects. Also, the 
extent to which equity option spreads are affected by macroeconomic news announcements 
delivers new insights on the intraday determination of option liquidity and the systematic 
component of liquidity.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the market structure of 
NYSE LIFFE and Section 3 discusses the development of hypotheses. Section 4 outlines the 
data selection and variable construction. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and the 
final section concludes the paper. 
 
2. NYSE LIFFE Market Structure 
NYSE LIFFE is the European derivatives branch of NYSE, overseeing a total of five 
European markets (Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, London and Paris). Trading in individual 
equity options occurs on the Amsterdam, Brussels, London and Paris exchanges.4 Trading on 
NYSE LIFFE occurs via LIFFE CONNECT, an anonymous, electronic, order-driven system, 
which operates an “open system” architecture allowing users direct access via an Application 
Program Interface (API).5 Market makers act as liquidity providers on NYSE LIFFE under 
                                                          
4 Brussels is dropped from the analysis due to limited trading.  
5 “How the Euronext.liffe markets work”. Available on the NYSE LIFFE website. 
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the Euronext Liquidity Provider System (ELPS), which was originally introduced for the 
Amsterdam options market and has since migrated to all individual equity contracts traded on 
LIFFE CONNECT. Market making refers to the simultaneous submission of bid and ask 
quotations that meet the spread and size obligations set by the scheme for each particular 
contract.  
With the exception of Amsterdam, NYSE LIFFE uses two terms for market makers in these 
markets. Primary Liquidity Providers (PLP) provide continuous quotes for a number of in-
the-money and out-of-the-money contracts. Competitive Liquidity Providers (CLP) provide 
continuous quotes for a number of near-the-money contracts.6 For NYSE LIFFE Amsterdam, 
Competitive Market Makers (CMM) have obligations similar to CLPs and Primary Market 
Makers (PMM) provide continuous quotes across all series in all maturities for all individual 
equity options (further details below). Market makers effectively submit limit orders for 
which time and price priority rules also apply and in return receive trading fee rebates which 
are determined by the liquidity provider’s performance based on meeting the minimum 
quotation requirements.7  
Market makers’ spread and size obligations are a function of the price and volatility of the 
underlying asset (updated semi-annually) and refer to maximum spread and minimum size 
(e.g. a maximum spread of 50p and a minimum of 10 contracts). Spread and size obligations 
are therefore not uniform across all assets. Market makers are obliged to offer continuous 
quotes for at least 85% of the relevant number of series and during at least 85% of the 
                                                          
6 “Near-the-money” is a dynamic area and is defined as a percentage mark up (down) from the lowest (highest) 
underlying share price of the current day. 
7 PMMs may also have the right to receive a percentage of the turnover traded at the PMM’s best bid or ask 
price. CMMs and PMMs may quote spreads up to twice the maximum contractually agreed spread. 
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specific time period. All market makers are required to trade a minimum number of contracts 
of high liquidity assets.8 Trading fee reductions are not uniform and are based on monthly 
evaluations of each market maker’s performance. 
The above arrangements provide a degree of discretion to market makers regarding meeting 
their spread and size obligations. This implies that the minimum level of liquidity is not 
always achieved and this is further reinforced by the fact that market participants cannot 
submit quote requests to market makers. Market makers as well as non-market makers are 
able to view the complete depth of the order book, depending on their trading arrangements 
with the exchange. In Chan, Chung and Johnson’s (1995) dataset, the order book was 
separately handled by an exchange employee, depriving the market makers from the 
information contained within it (see Vijh, 1990). A crucial difference between our work and 
Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995) is the fact that the order book is a major component in our 
study (see Neal, 1992).9 This feature of NYSE LIFFE considerably reduces the role of 
inventory risk management for option contracts. The exchange is responsible for allocating 
market makers for each individual equity option, however during the period that the schemes 
run, several market maker mutations occur and new market makers may be added on specific 
tickers.10   
                                                          
8 Asset liquidity and hence the number of market makers for each asset is assessed and defined by the exchange. 
9 At NYSE LIFFE, market makers’ trades are indistinguishable from limit order book trades i.e. market makers 
are obliged to post quotes at the limit order book whereas at CBOE market makers did not trade on the order 
book. In contrast, Chung and Zhao (2004) show that spreads established by market makers on NYSE stocks 
reflect market making costs which are however distinguishable from the spreads established on the limit order 
book. 
10 Unfortunately, the exchange does not publish any market making statistics, especially with regard to the 
overall proportion of trading that is conducted via market makers. However, the exchange has confirmed to the 
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3. Development of Hypotheses 
3.1. Models of intraday equity option liquidity and its determinants 
The first hypothesis is concerned with the role of market makers in the determination of 
intraday equity option liquidity in the context of a hybrid order book market with competing 
market makers.  Section 2 describes the process of market making at NYSE LIFFE and here 
we draw attention to the intraday pattern of equity option liquidity and the determinants of 
intraday option liquidity. 
A popular explanation for the intraday determination of liquidity is the inventory 
management theory (see Ho and Stoll, 1981; Amihud and Mendelson, 1982). This theory 
argues that market makers have a “preferred” inventory level and hence there is a cost 
involved in any deviation. Market makers adjust their bid-ask prices to optimize their 
inventory levels, thus bid-ask spreads widen when their inventory level diverges from the 
‘preferred’ level. 
Alternative explanations focus on the role of information in the determination of intraday 
liquidity. In particular, the information asymmetry hypothesis posits that investors will adjust 
their spreads when the probability of trading with an informed trader increases (see Ho and 
Stoll, 1983; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985). Empirical evidence provides support 
for this hypothesis. Charoenwong and Chung (2000) show that specialists and limit order 
traders quote smaller depths for riskier stocks (defined by high return volatility) to limit 
potential losses to informed traders, and quote larger depths for stocks with greater trading 
volume. For the US options market, Wei and Zheng (2010) show that option volatility is the 
most important determinant of daily option liquidity. Wyart et al. (2008) identify a strong 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
authors that the Amsterdam market is dominated by non-market makers, whereas the London and Paris markets 
rely more on the market-making facility. 
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positive correlation between spread and the volatility per trade (i.e., mid-point return 
volatility), implying that the main determinant of the bid-ask spread is the adverse selection 
component arising from informed trading. Chordia et al. (2001) document that volatility is 
closely associated with asymmetric information and that higher volatility leads to wider 
spreads in equity markets. Finally, Danielsson and Payne (2012) show that intraday liquidity 
is strongly positively associated with intraday volatility in the FX market.  
In a similar context, Cho and Engle (2009) and Engle and Neri (2010) argue that the positive 
association between option spreads and option liquidity can be explained by the derivatives 
hedging theory. The latter implies that option market makers are mainly concerned with 
hedging their positions in the underlying market. Hence, as long as their option trades are 
hedged, the inventory management component of the spread is no longer a significant option 
liquidity determinant.  
We hypothesize that in a “decentralized” trading system such as the equity options market at 
NYSE LIFFE, the influence of inventory management practices on option liquidity is 
diminished. The latter is in line with the predictions of Ho and Stoll (1983) for a competitive 
dealer market. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 1: In an order book market with competing market makers, traders are more 
concerned with option volatility than inventory management.    
 
Further, to date, there are no empirical studies on the intraday determinants of equity option 
liquidity. We develop hypotheses based on relevant studies for the US options market (see 
Wei and Zheng, 2010) and drawing from empirical findings for the equity and FX markets. 
For the FX market, Danielsson and Payne (2012) show that spreads widen and depths are 
reduced in high volume and volatile intraday intervals. For the equity markets, volatility is 
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closely associated with asymmetric information and higher volatility leads to wider spreads 
(see Chordia et al., 2001). 
Also, for the US options market, Wei and Zheng (2010) argue that an inverse relationship 
between spreads and volume is expected if inventory risk is important. Similarly, Engle and 
Neri (2010) predict the same relationship because higher volume implies lower order 
processing costs. 
Transaction frequency also reflects order processing costs and spreads are expected to widen 
when the number of trades decreases. Cho and Engle (1999) hypothesize that the expected 
relationship between bid-ask spread and time-to-maturity is negative because American-style 
options that are near maturity are more likely to be exercised and this will increase the 
difficulty for market makers to maintain their hedged positions.  Wei and Zheng (2010) show 
that moneyness reflects the leverage effect or the effect of option return volatility. Dufour and 
Engle (2000) show that spreads are positively correlated with trade duration. Based on the 
above we develop the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Intraday equity option liquidity is positively related to volatility and trade 
duration and negatively related to volume, trade frequency, maturity and moneyness. 
 
3.2. Macro-economic news and equity option liquidity 
A topic which is closely related to the determinants of equity option liquidity is the 
incorporation of information in asset prices. That is, how is liquidity determined following 
the arrival of new macroeconomic information? A number of previous studies address this 
issue for equity and bond markets (e.g. Chordia et al., 2001 and Riordan et al., 2013), 
however there are no studies on this question in the equity options market. Fleming and 
Remolona (1999) find that the arrival of macroeconomic announcements in the U.S. Treasury 
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market sets off a two-stage adjustment process for intraday bid-ask spreads, trading volume 
and prices, where spreads widen in a brief first stage and remain moderately wide (the normal 
level) in a prolonged second stage.  The authors explain that market makers widen (or 
withdraw) their bid and ask quotes in response to the inventory risks of sharp price changes at 
an announcement time, then the sharp price change is followed by a surge in trading volume 
that narrows the spread.  Fleming and Krishnan (2012) find a similar pattern in the U.S. 
Treasury inflation-protected securities market. Since theory and empirical literature suggest 
that macroeconomic news affects asset prices and liquidity, we conjecture that option market 
liquidity will also react significantly to these events.    
    
Hypothesis 3: Intraday equity option liquidity deteriorates immediately following a 
macroeconomic news event but reverts quickly to “normal” levels.  
 
3.3. Commonality in intraday equity option liquidity 
The proposition that equity option liquidity at NYSE LIFFE is affected by macroeconomic 
news also implies that there could be a strong systematic component in the liquidity. This 
systematic liquidity would capture the market-wide effects during a trading day. Huberman 
and Halka (2001) document the presence of a systematic, time-varying component of 
liquidity in NYSE stocks using daily data. Chordia et al. (2000) and Hasbrouck and Seppi 
(2001) find an intraday common component in US stock liquidity. Using a high-frequency 
dataset on Greek stocks, Dunne et al. (2011) document substantial co-movements in returns, 
order flows and liquidity, both on a market-wide basis and on an individual security basis. 
Based on these empirical findings in stock markets, we conjecture the similar existence of 
systematic liquidity in the option market. 
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Hypothesis 4: Intraday equity option liquidity exhibits strong commonality during the trading 
day. 
 
4. Data, Empirical Specification and Descriptive Statistics 
4.1.  Data sources and sample selection  
We use an extensive intraday dataset consisting of 34 months of tick data for all individual 
equity options (henceforth tickers) trading at NYSE-LIFFE Amsterdam, London and Paris, 
from March 2008 to December 2010.11 The option contracts traded for each ticker vary 
according to strike price, maturity date and contract type (i.e. call or put) (these are referred 
to as ‘sub-tickers’ hereafter). The data files contain information on maturity date, strike price, 
volume and price, time-stamped to the nearest second, separately for asks, bids and trades. 
We omit tickers for which we failed to identify their underlying instruments from 
DataStream. For Paris, we omit European-style contracts so that all options in the sample are 
American-style. For Amsterdam, we omit options traded on weekly and daily expiry cycles, 
because there are few of these contracts and their short expiry cycles may distort the results. 
Overall, the majority of tickers remain in the sample (see Panel A of Table 1). For 
Amsterdam, 90 percent of contracts are retained, while the figures for London (Paris) are 93 
(84) percent.  
 
***insert Table 1 here*** 
 
                                                          
11 The number of tickers reflects the total number of firm-options trading at the exchanges and includes delisted 
options. 
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For each exchange and contract type (call or put), we categorize sub-tickers according to their 
moneyness level and days to expiration. Moneyness is defined as S/K, where S refers to the 
daily opening price of the underlying asset (not adjusted for dividend payments) and K refers 
to the option strike price. We subsequently select sub-tickers that fall within the at-the-money 
range (defined here as 0.95 to 1.05). Similarly, we control for expiration effects by focusing 
on short-term options only; sub-tickers that are between 90 and 7 days from expiration are 
selected.  
We delete outliers based on spread and price criteria as follows. All zero volume, zero price 
and out-of-hours observations are deleted.12 Quotes with negative or zero bid-ask spreads are 
dropped from the sample. Also, as in Wei and Zheng (2010), we control for possible outlying 
data by dropping quotes with excessively large bid-ask spreads. The cut-off point for the 
percentage bid-ask spreads is set at 150%.  
 
4.2.  Estimation of liquidity variables  
We estimate several variables. Quoted spreads and depth serve as estimates of quote 
liquidity. Intraday volatility is based on 5-minute absolute returns. Traded volume and 
transaction frequency are derived from the trades sample and time-to-maturity and 
moneyness are allocated to each intraday interval. All variables are estimated at a ticker level 
                                                          
12 All three exchanges are open between 08:00 and 16:30 (London time). We drop the first five and last five 
minutes of trading from the calculations in order to avoid any overnight effects on prices and price distortions 
during the last five minutes of trading. We also delete half-days. There are no zero-volume trades in the raw 
dataset. However we include this restriction because the sample contains reported trades hence all trades should 
contain a reported traded volume. The latter is an important distinction from datasets where market orders may 
contain zero volume (pre-reporting). 
13 
 
 
and then aggregated to equal-weighted averages for each date-time interval. The definitions 
of each variable are described below.  
The estimation of quoted spreads, depths and option returns is based on sub-ticker midquotes 
which are calculated at 5-minute intervals from bid and ask prices as follows. At each trading 
day, we select the first quote of the day which is however quoted no later than 8.01am. We 
then retain bid and ask quotes at 5-minute intervals, h, however we control for stale pricing 
by dropping bid and ask prices that are recorded more than two minutes prior to each 5-
minute interval. For the closing return (16:30), a 2-minute rule applies. We only estimate 
midquotes when both ask and bid prices are found within the aforementioned intervals. The 
above procedure allows us to maintain the maximum number of observations at regular time 
intervals, controlling at the same time for the biases of missing variables and stale pricing. 
The above discussion does not imply that the 5-minute spreads are calculated from one bid 
and one ask price only. Instead, we calculate the average per sub-tickers for all quotes that 
meet the criteria within each time interval. Excluding the opening and closing, n denotes the 
total number of intraday intervals (101). 
The most commonly used spread measure is the quoted bid-ask spread, defined as the 
difference between the most recent ask and bid prices (see Petrella, 2006; Cao and Wei, 
2010; Wei and Zheng, 2010). For each sub-ticker, we control for price level differences by 
calculating the percentage bid-ask spread (PBASt), defined as the ratio of quoted spread over 
the quote midpoint:  
 
 
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆5−𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 100 ×
𝐴𝑠𝑘5−𝑚𝑖𝑛 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑5−𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑀5−𝑚𝑖𝑛
 
(1) 
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where Ask5-min  and Bid5-min are the ask and bid prices sampled at 5-minute intervals 
respectively and and M5-min is the trade midquote defined as half the sum of bid and ask prices 
at each interval. A reciprocal measure of liquidity is quoted depth (see Harris, 1990). Lee et 
al. (1993) show that spreads are only one dimension of liquidity, because dealers who narrow 
spreads while reducing depths may be perceived as providing more liquidity while in fact 
they do not. They conclude that decreases (increases) in liquidity are associated with a 
simultaneous widening (narrowing) of the spread and a reduction (increase) in depth. Vijh 
(1990) associates depth with the number of market makers because increases in the number 
of market makers are associated with higher costs of carrying more inventory. The author 
shows that market depth at the CBOE is offered at the expense of wider bid-ask spreads, thus 
when depths increase, spreads also widen because market makers request higher 
compensation to recover the higher inventory costs of providing greater depth. These results 
are opposite to those reported by Lee et al. (1993) for the NYSE whereby depths and spreads 
are inversely related, reflecting two dimensions of liquidity.13 In an order-book setting, 
spreads and depths are expected to be substitutes if greater depths have no implication for 
inventory management costs.    
We measure quoted depth (Depth) in number of contracts as follows: 
 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑡ℎ5−𝑚𝑖𝑛 =
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑘,5−𝑚𝑖𝑛 + 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑖𝑑,5−𝑚𝑖𝑛
2
 
(2) 
 
                                                          
13 It can be shown that liquidity has four dimensions: width, depth, immediacy, resiliency (see Cho and Engle, 
1999). Width (spread) and depth are by far the most common liquidity measures. On NYSE LIFFE, spread and 
depth are combined to define the contractual obligations of liquidity providers. 
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where Volumeask,5-min and VolumeBid,5-min refer to the number of contracts quoted at the ask 
and bid prices, respectively. 
Logarithmic intraday returns (r) are calculated on midquote prices at a sub-ticker level, 
however large jumps may be recorded (despite the maximum spread selection criterion). 
Also, a problem arises with the calculation of realized volatility in less liquid markets as the 
definition of realized volatility (sum of intraday squared returns) implies that returns are 
estimated for all intraday intervals. We alleviate these issues as follows. First, we omit 
returns whose absolute value is greater than three standard deviations from their mean per 
ticker (only one percent of the observations). Returns are averaged for each ticker at an 
intraday level. Second, we use the absolute value of intraday 5-minute returns as a measure of 
intraday volatility. Finally, in order to be consistent with the use of quoted liquidity and to 
avoid any stale pricing problems, we use the average quoted volume per interval as an 
intraday measure of trading activity. We construct equally-weighted averages at each interval 
for all variables and each intraday variable is standardized by subtracting the daily mean and 
dividing by the daily standard deviation for each trading day of each ticker.  
 
4.3.  Descriptive statistics   
Panel B of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics, separately for each market and also for 
calls and puts. For Amsterdam, the average percentage spread is 12.18 percent for calls and 
11.41 percent for puts. For London, spreads are on average 18.20 percent for calls and 16.78 
for puts and for Paris the equivalent figures are 13.90 and 12.78 respectively. We reject the 
null hypotheses of an equality of means across calls and puts for each market.  
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The depth value for Amsterdam is substantially greater than those for London and Paris, 
which is somewhat surprising as further analysis shows that the actual trade size in 
Amsterdam differs little from the actual trade sizes in other LIFFE markets. The explanation 
lies in the differences in the composition of investors across markets. A 2011 survey by 
NYSE Euronext and TNS Sofres found that equity option contracts are particularly popular 
among retail investors in Amsterdam, whereas retail investors in Paris are much less likely to 
participate in option markets. Specifically, 62 percent of the survey respondents held options 
in the Netherlands compared to 5 percent in France. The exchange has confirmed that retail 
trading activity in London is also much lower than in Amsterdam. Discussions with market 
makers have revealed that it is standard practice to quote large depths in the Amsterdam 
market as a means to reassure retail investors that the market is sufficiently liquid. Under 
these circumstances, a sudden drop in depth in Amsterdam may not imply a drop in liquidity. 
Across all three markets, put prices are less volatile than call prices and we uniformly reject 
the null hypothesis of equality in the distribution between calls and puts. The average traded 
volume for each five minute interval is 266.44 (209.30) for calls (puts) in Amsterdam. For 
London (Paris), the corresponding figures are 35.31 (98.26) for puts and 39.92 (110.79) for 
calls.Both London and Paris report on average less than one trade per interval whereas in 
Amsterdam transaction frequency increases substantially to an average 8 trades per interval 
for calls and 6 for puts.14 The difference in traded liquidity is also reflected in the duration 
between trades. The average duration is 14 (18) minutes for Amsterdam calls (puts), 44 (49) 
minutes for London calls (puts), and 39 (43) minutes for Paris calls (puts).  
 
                                                          
14 In this table, transaction frequency refers to the ratio of the total number of trades per category over the total 
number of date-time intervals. 
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*** insert Table 2 here*** 
 
Table 2 presents the average option quoted bid-ask spreads within volatility, volume and 
transaction frequency quintiles. Spreads widen with higher levels of option volatility. This 
finding holds for each market and for both calls and puts. Also, depths decrease with option 
volatility. Option volume is associated with option volatility, and according to the inventory 
management theory, spreads should narrow with option volume (see Wei and Zheng, 2010). 
In contrast to this inventory management theory, spreads widen with volume in each market. 
Mixed results are reported for depths for London and Paris. Clearly, depth decreases for 
Amsterdam. Finally, transaction frequency is generally considered a measure of order 
processing costs. For all three markets, spreads widen with higher levels of transaction 
frequency. Also, for Amsterdam and London, depths motonotically increase with transaction 
frequency, but this finding is not confirmed for Paris. The Kruskal-Wallis test statistics for 
equality of means of each quintile across market and contract types uniformly reject the null 
hypothesis. Table 2 offers preliminary evidence relating to Hypothesis 1.  
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1. Intraday behaviour of equity option liquidity and its determinants  
In the first part of this sub-section, we examine to what extent inventory management can 
explain the intraday behaviour of liquidity in the equity options market (Hypothesis 1). As 
discussed in Section 3, we hypothesize that in a “decentralized” trading system like NYSE 
LIFFE for equity options, inventory management models cannot explain the intraday 
behaviour of liquidity. Instead, in line with Ho and Stoll (1983), option liquidity is expected 
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to be primarily determined by option volatility. The latter notion has been mainly associated 
with information asymmetries (see Wyart et al., 2008) but also with the derivatives hedging 
theory (see Engle and Neri, 2010 and Cho and Engle, 1999). In order to investigate this 
hypothesis, we estimate the following regression for intraday option liquidity and option 
volatility: 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑛𝑑_𝑉𝑡 = 𝑎0 +∑𝛼𝑖𝐷𝑡
101
𝑖=1
+ 𝜖𝑡 (3) 
 
Stnd_Vt refers to the t-th observation of the standardised variable (PBAS, Depth, Volatility). 
Dt refers to dummy variables for each 5-minute interval t. In total there are 101 5-minute 
intervals during the trading day, but we omit the interval at the middle of the day (12:00-
12:05) which is captured by the coefficient α0. When presenting the results, the coefficient for 
each intraday interval is the sum of the regression coefficient for that interval and the 
constant, therefore we drop the constant from the figures. Equation (3) is estimated with the 
Newey-West correction. Results for Equation (3) are presented in Figure 1.15 
 
*** insert Figure 1 here*** 
 
For the US options market, Engle and Neri (2010) show that spreads are wider in the morning 
and widen again at the end of the trading day, nonetheless not to the same level. For a 
                                                          
15 In order to conserve space, Figures 1-3 only present the results for call contracts. The results for put contracts 
are very similar and are available upon request. 
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competitive dealer market, Frino et al. (2008) report an increase in depth and a narrowing of 
the bid-ask spreads at the market close, a finding that they attribute to inventory management 
practices. Importantly, the authors show that the pattern of intraday spreads cannot be 
attributed to the pattern of intraday volatility. In light of the findings by Frino et al. (2008), 
spreads and depths at NYSE LIFFE are expected to reflect two dimensions of liquidity and 
hence to move in opposite directions during the day. Also, according to the inventory 
management theory, both liquidity and volatility measures should increase at the market 
close. However, in contrast to competitive dealer markets, in this study, it is hypothesized 
that market maker influence diminishes under a “decentralized” trading system (such as 
NYSE LIFFE). If inventory risk is not important, then liquidity should not be affected at the 
market close. 
For all three markets, spreads are at their widest level at the beginning of the trading day. For 
Amsterdam, spreads remain elevated and significant until 09:30, however for London and 
Paris, spreads reach their daily average levels in the first 30 minutes of trading. During the 
morning session, spreads decline monotonically, a process that is only interrupted by clear 
drops in liquidity at 09:00, 09:30 and 10:00. All three times coincide with macroeconomic 
announcements. A less pronounced drop in liquidity is documented at 12:30. During the 
afternoon session, two clear sudden falls in liquidity emerge. The first at 13:30 coincides with 
the US market open. Also, the second spike coincides with US scheduled macroeconomic 
announcements. No significant variation from the mean is observed at the market close. This 
latter finding is in contrast with the findings of Lee et al. (1993) for NYSE (a specialist 
market), where a U-shape spread pattern is observed. However, the results also differ from 
Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995) for the CBOE and Frino et al. (2008) for the SFE, two 
competitive dealer markets. This finding supports the hypothesis that inventory risk is not 
important for NYSE LIFFE equity options. 
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*** insert Figure 2 here*** 
 
The results for quoted depth are presented in Figure 2. For Amsterdam and Paris, depth is 
reciprocal to spreads and follows the reverse pattern during the trading day. At market open, 
Amsterdam (Paris) depth is approximately 1.9 (1.3) standard deviations below the daily 
mean. However, for London, depth is higher than the daily mean at the market open and 
remains high during the morning session. Except for London, depth is at its lowest levels at 
the market open and increases sharply after the first hour of trading. A very clear inverse 
association between the spread and depth measures emerges. Vijh (1990) shows that in 
competitive dealer markets, spreads and depths have a positive association which reflects the 
costs of carrying more inventory. This finding is strongly disputed here for the NYSE LIFFE 
for Amsterdam and Paris. Market depth remains stable throughout the trading day and is low 
at the market close for Amsterdam only. As with the spread measures, these results on depth 
at the market close are not consistent with the findings of prior literature for the NYSE, a 
specialist market, (widening spread, decrease in depth (Lee et al., 1993)) nor results for the 
SFE (narrowing spread, increase in depth (Frino et al., 2008)), a competitive dealer market. 
Both studies agree that the volatility in the spread and depth measures at the market close is 
related to market structure differences, as the monopolistic power of dealers on the NYSE 
widens spreads at the market close, whilst the competitive presence of market makers at the 
CBOE and SFE drive spreads narrower. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
market maker influence diminishes in the market structure employed by NYSE LIFFE for the 
European equity options and are also consistent with Engle and Neri’s (2010) view that 
option traders manage their risks by hedging their positions in the underlying market. 
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Figure 3 presents the intraday patterns for option volatility. Across all three markets, 
volatility is high at the market open and reduces gradually for the remainder of the morning 
session. Considering the time intervals with a sudden widening in spreads in Figure 1, we see 
that this is associated with volatility in the following interval. This spike in volatility implies 
a contemporaneous rather a lagged effect that arises from the calculation of volatility as the 
absolute return between two consecutive intervals.  Similarly, option volatility increases 
sharply during the interval following the US market open and also at 15:05 related to the US 
market events. 
 
*** insert Figure 3 here*** 
 
So far in this section, we fail to provide evidence regarding the influence of inventory 
management in equity options liquidity during the trading day. Instead, the findings are in 
line with the prediction of Ho and Stoll (1983), (and empirically those of Wei and Zheng, 
2010) for a competitive dealer market. Option volatility appears to be the most important 
determinant of liquidity in a hybrid market such as for equity options trading at NYSE 
LIFFE. We discuss these findings further in the multivariate analysis below. 
Proceeding from this, we aim to more formally establish the intraday determinants of equity 
option liquidity (Hypothesis 2). We estimate the following regression: 
 
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 = 𝑎0 +∑𝛼𝑖𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−𝑖
6
𝑖=1
+ 𝑎7𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑡
+ 𝑎8𝑉𝑙𝑚𝑡+ 𝑎9𝑇𝑟𝑡 + 𝑎10𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑡 + 𝑎11𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡 + 𝑎12𝐷𝑢𝑟𝑡 + 𝜖𝑡 
(4) 
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Where PBAS refers to percentage quoted bid-ask spread. Lagged values of the dependent 
variable to capture autocorrelation effects.16 Volt refers to the absolute return which is used as 
a measure of volatility, Vlm refers to the natural logarithm of the average quoted volume, and 
Tr refers to transaction frequency. TTM and Mon are control variables that refer to time-to-
maturity in days and moneyness, respectively. Dur refers to the number of minutes between 
trades during a trading day. All estimations are reported with Newey-West standard errors. 
The results are presented in Table 3.  
 
*** insert Table 3 here*** 
 
Consistent with Danielsson and Payne (2012) for the FX market, the results confirm the 
hypothesis that spreads widen during volatile intraday intervals. We report a positive sign for 
quoted volume for Amsterdam calls, while negative signs for London and Paris. The 
volatility and volume findings for Amsterdam generally confirm that inventory management 
effects are not strong for that market. One possible explanation for this is the popularity of 
equity options contracts with retail investors in Amsterdam. These findings are consistent 
with information asymmetry models and the derivatives hedging theory (see Wyart et al., 
2008 and Engle and Neri, 2010). For Paris and London, volume is negatively associated with 
spreads, a finding that is in line with inventory management (see Wei and Zheng, 2010). In 
order to study this effect further, we regress traded spreads (effective half-spreads) against 
traded volume. The results show that traded volume is positively associated with spreads, 
                                                          
16 The selection of the lag order does not materially change the results.  
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which further supports the information asymmetry hypothesis (results not reported to 
conserve space). Transaction frequency reflects order processing costs and spreads are 
expected to widen when the number of trades decreases. This hypothesis is confirmed for 
Amsterdam calls only.   
As hypothesized, near-maturity options exhibit wider spreads. This is in line with Cho and 
Engle’s (1999) hypothesis that American-style options that are near maturity are more likely 
to be exercised and this will increase the difficulty for market makers to maintain their 
hedged positions, hence a negative sign would be expected. The coefficient for moneyness is 
negative and highly significant for 5 of 6 cases, confirming the leverage effect and option 
return volatility hypothesis from Wei and Zheng (2010).17 Dufour and Engle (2000) show 
that spreads are positively correlated with durations. Consistent with their findings, we show 
that the coefficient for duration is positive and significant for the more frequently traded 
markets (Amsterdam and London).  
 
5.2. The effect of macro-economic news on intraday equity option liquidity 
 
*** insert Table 4 here*** 
 
In this section we initially investigate which news announcements affect intraday equity 
option liquidity (Hypothesis 3). Equation (5) includes intraday event dummies to capture the 
                                                          
17 In a separate set of regressions, we also confirm the findings of Cho and Engle (1999) and Engle and Neri 
(2010) that PBAS is convex in moneyness and time to maturity (results not presented but available on request). 
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effects of specific announcements on liquidity. We use country-specific events along with 
European Union and US events. Table 4 presents the type and time of each announcement 
category. All announcements are downloaded from Bloomberg, and we used Bloomberg’s 
relevance index to identify the most important macroeconomic announcements. In total, we 
use 18 event dummies. For Paris, all macroeconomic announcements are released before the 
market opens. All times are GMT. Each equation is estimated using OLS and Newey-West 
standard errors are reported. We also estimate the same regressions but with depth as the 
dependent variable. The results are similar but are not presented here in order to conserve 
space (available upon request). We estimate the following regression: 
 
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 = 𝑎0 +∑𝛼𝑖𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−𝑖
6
𝑖=1
+∑𝛼𝑖
12
𝑖=7
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖  + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
16
𝑖=13
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
23
𝑖=17
𝐸𝑢𝑟𝑜𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
30
𝑖=24
𝑈𝑆𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡 
(5) 
 
Where PBAS refers to percentage bid-ask spread. Control refers to the exogenous variables 
from Equation (4). Country, Euro and US refer to the country-specific, European Union-
specific and US-specific set of dummy variables (identified in Table 4). The coefficients on 
the macroeconomic announcement dummies are presented in Table 5. 
 
*** insert Table 5 here*** 
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For the country-specific dummies, CPI and GDP announcements lead to decreased liquidity 
for London puts and London calls respectively. Unemployment news is positively associated 
with liquidity for London and negatively for Amsterdam. European Central Bank interest rate 
announcements lead to a widening of the spread for Amsterdam puts and Paris calls.18 
Clearly, European CPI and Industrial Production announcements have a strong effect on 
option liquidity but we fail to provide similar evidence for the Euro-wide GDP 
announcements. The money supply dummy remains insignificant for 5 of 6 regressions and 
the European trade balance indicator announcements are positive and highly significant for 
Amsterdam only. It is clear that the market is strongly influenced by US announcements. In 
particular, the coefficients on four of six US macroeconomic events are positive and highly 
significant (CPI, GDP, InProd and Lead), especially for the most liquid Amsterdam and 
London markets. As anticipated, the US open market dummy has a strong and positive 
relation with option liquidity. 
Having established that macroeconomic news can be considered as liquidity shocks, we 
establish how long it takes for liquidity to revert back to its “normal” level after a news 
shock.19 The procedure we adopt to establish shock duration is visually described in Figure 4. 
 
*** insert Figure 4 here*** 
 
                                                          
18 In separate regressions, we also confirm this finding for the Bank of England interest rate and UK money 
supply announcements. 
19 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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Controlling for the macroeconomic shocks, the path of PBAS can be forecasted from the 
autoregressive coefficients of Equation (5). For example, given knowledge of the average 
PBAS in the time periods prior to an event, we can forecast the spread as the weighted sum of 
means of the autoregressive coefficients plus the constant term. This is represented by the 
dotted line in Figure 4 and denotes the “normal” path the PBAS would have taken had an 
event not occurred.20 Having established the “normal” path of PBAS, we are then able to 
compare it with the “realized” path that represents the mean PBAS in the intervals after each 
shock. That comparison would then denote the duration of the shock. We estimate the results 
for each news source, however for simplicity we only report the group results to Country-, 
Euro- and US-specific shocks and also separately for the US market open. The results are 
presented in Figure 5. 
 
*** insert Figure 5 here*** 
 
The results show that the effects of news are generally short-lived. In the case of Country and 
EU effects, shocks usually disappear within 5 minutes, a finding which is consistent across all 
markets and contract types. However, for the US news and US equity market opening time, 
shocks are more persistent. In general, bid-ask spreads revert back to their “normal” levels 
within 10 minutes of the release time.  
                                                          
20 Clearly the spread could have any slope and the positive slope is only used here as an example.  
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A final question regarding the effect of macroeconomic news on equity option liquidity is the 
extent of any cross-country effect. For example, do the UK macroeconomic announcements 
impact the French equity options market? We estimate the following regression. 
 
𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡 = 𝑎0 +∑𝛼𝑖𝑃𝐵𝐴𝑆𝑡−𝑖
6
𝑖=1
+∑𝛼𝑖
12
𝑖=7
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
30
𝑖=13
𝑀𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
34
𝑖=31
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖 + 𝜖𝑡 (6) 
 
Where PBAS refers to percentage bid-ask spread. Control refers to the exogenous variables in 
Equation 4. Macro refers to the country-specific, European Union-specific and US-specific 
set of dummy variables (identified in Table 4). Cross refers to a set of dummy variables that 
capture possible cross-country effects. For example, for Amsterdam, we add a set of dummies 
that refer to the UK macroeconomic news announcements. For Paris, all macroeconomic 
announcements are made prior to the market opening, hence there are no cross-country 
dummy variables. The results are presented in Table 6. 
 
*** insert Table 6 here*** 
 
In general, UK CPI and GDP announcements have a spill-over effect on the equity option 
liquidity of the Dutch and French markets. In contrast, London liquidity is only partially 
affected by the Amsterdam Trade Balance announcements. The results also confirm that put 
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contracts react more strongly to cross-country effects and cross-country events typically 
increase option liquidity. The additional explanatory power from the cross-country effects is 
modest.  
 
5.3. Commonality in intraday equity option liquidity 
The above results confirm the hypothesis that equity options are prone to market-wide effects 
during the trading day that strongly determine the intraday pattern of option liquidity. To 
explore this further, this section  studies commonality in liquidity across options contracts by 
constructing plots of systematic liquidity during the trading day (Hypothesis 4). We employ 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to infer the intraday commonality in liquidity. The 
procedure is as follows. First, we apply the PCA to 30-minute intervals since there are not 
enough observations to guarantee a continuous sample at a higher frequency. In total, there 
are seventeen 30-minute intervals (n) during the trading day. N is the total number of days in 
the sample, hence the total number of 30-minute intervals is N×n. We treat each interval 
independently and in order to accommodate missing data, we apply two criteria. First, for 
each interval, we only use tickers that report quotes for 80% of the number of days. Second, 
we interpolate missing values by using the mean liquidity estimate per interval. This allows 
us to retain the maximum number of tickers per interval and also use a n x i matrix where the 
number of intervals (n) is greater than the number of tickers (i). All ticker measures are 
standardized by the daily mean and daily standard deviation per ticker in order to avoid 
overweighting because of scale differences (see Korajczyk and Sadka, 2008; Dunne et al., 
2011). 
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For each trading day, we extract the first three principal components. We plot the proportion 
of variance explained by the first principal factor in Figure 6.  
 
*** insert Figure 6 here*** 
 
For Amsterdam, the proportion of variance explained by the first principal factor is on 
average 12% for calls and 11% for puts, nevertheless systematic liquidity varies considerably 
during the trading day. Thus, in the first 30 minutes of trading the proportion of systematic 
liquidity is 21% for both calls and puts and follows a U-shape pattern with a low of 7% for 
calls and 6.5% for puts at 11:30. A second peak in systematic liquidity is observed at 15:00. 
For London, the average figures are 14% for calls and 13% for puts. Clearly systematic 
liquidity is at its highest level at the market open and levels off during the day with two 
distinctive peaks at 13:30 and 15:00. Finally, the average systematic liquidity figure for Paris 
is 16% for both calls and puts. The proportion of systematic liquidity is on average 27% at 
the market open and in contrast to the other markets, the Paris market appears to have 
additional elevated systematic liquidity at 10:00 and 12:00. The common peaks across the 
three plots correspond to overnight information arrival and the US equity market opening, 
which are logical sources of systematic movements. 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
For option markets, the literature on liquidity is very thin. To our knowledge, there are no 
prior studies on the intraday determination of equity option liquidity. This paper focuses on 
two main aspects of option liquidity: (i) the intraday behaviour of equity option liquidity and 
its determinants and (ii) the influence of macro-economic events and commonality on 
intraday equity option liquidity. We contribute to the options market microstructure literature 
in several respects explained below. 
We examine the intraday patterns of liquidity and volatility at NYSE LIFFE, an electronic, 
order-driven market with registered trading members and competing liquidity providers. This 
is crucial in order to determine the influence of the order book on inventory management. We 
contest the claim made in Frino et al. (2008) that inventory management models explain the 
intraday variations in option spreads and depths. Option liquidity measures are strongly 
correlated with option volatility. We suggest that this finding reflects the practices of traders 
who manage their risks by hedging their positions in the underlying market (see Engle and 
Neri, 2010). This explains why our results differ from the intraday pattern of liquidity 
measures observed by Frino et al. (2008) for the SFE and also explains why intraday spreads 
decrease monotonically on NASDAQ (see Chan, Christie and Schultz, 1995) but are 
correlated with volatility on CBOE (see Chan, Chung and Johnson, 1995) and NYSE LIFFE. 
We show that the option liquidity measures are strongly correlated with option volatility. For 
Amsterdam, in contrast to the expected outcome if inventory risk were an important 
component of the bid-ask spread, increases in volume and volatility are associated with 
decreases in liquidity. These findings are in line with information asymmetry models and the 
derivatives hedging theory. For London and Paris, we find evidence to support both the 
information asymmetry and inventory management models. 
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We study the reaction of option liquidity to a series of macroeconomic events. Option 
liquidity reacts strongly to US macroeconomic news announcements. Also, the average 
systematic liquidity component is 12% for Amsterdam, 14% for London and 16% for Paris. 
Systematic liquidity varies considerably during the trading day and is at its highest level 
during the market open then levels off during the day with two distinctive peaks at 13:30 and 
15:00.  
This is the first paper to use such a comprehensive dataset of quotes and trades to study 
individual equity option liquidity. Our findings imply a clear need for richer models of 
intraday volatility to incorporate liquidity spill-over effects. Finally, the extent to which 
equity option spreads respond to macroeconomic news announcements has not been 
previously studied, and this aspect sheds more light on the intraday determination of option 
liquidity and the systematic component of liquidity.  
Wei and Zheng (2010) present the view that “the quest for understanding option market 
liquidity has just begun.” This study sheds new light on the elusive concept of intraday option 
liquidity and the identification of its determinants. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics 
  Amsterdam London Paris 
  Call Put Call Put Call Put 
Panel A 
No. of days 709 709 714 
No. of tickers 65 (72) 65 (72) 99 (106) 99 (106) 59 (70) 59 (70) 
Panel B 
Spread             
Mean 12.18 11.41*** 18.20 16.78*** 13.90 12.78*** 
Min 5.28 5.59 6.10 5.99 6.23 5.58 
Max 66.15 60.64 88.31 79.42 63.38 55.55 
STD 2.88 2.74 5.22 4.97 3.23 3.02 
Depth             
Mean 555.88 572.66*** 24.61 24.59 69.41 69.27*** 
Min 22.50 22.50 5.00 5.00 21.67 21.67 
Max 1523.71 1586.00 96.29 101.04 159.60 276.02 
STD 156.74 157.54 8.28 8.35 9.37 9.27 
Panel C 
Volatility 1.60 1.43*** 1.88 1.67*** 1.75 1.55*** 
Volume 266.44 209.30*** 39.92 35.31*** 110.79 98.26*** 
No. of Trades 7.88 5.68*** 0.79 0.63*** 0.79 0.67*** 
Duration 14.26 18.05*** 43.68 49.48*** 38.92 42.68*** 
Number of days refer to the total number of trading days in the sample. Number of tickers refers to the total number of firm-options 
trading at the exchanges and includes delisted options. The figures in parentheses are the number of tickers in the raw dataset prior to 
application of our selection criteria. Spread refers to percentage quoted spread. Depth is calculated from the average of bids plus asks 
per five minute interval. Intraday volatility is estimated from 5-minute absolute returns. Volume refers to the average traded volume 
per interval. Number of trades refer to transaction frequency per 5-minute interval which is calculated as the total number of trades 
over the total number of date-time intervals. Duration is measured in minutes and refers to the average time between trades. *** denote 
a significant difference in means between calls and puts at the 1% level. 
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Table 2 
Liquidity by volatility, volume and transaction frequency 
  
 
Quintile 
1 2 3 4 5 
Amsterdam   
Spread Volatility 11.24 (10.73) 11.52 (10.89) 11.94 (11.17) 12.50 (11.60) 13.72 (12.64) 
  Volume 11.92 (11.11) 12.11 (11.39) 12.18 (11.51) 12.31 (11.56) 12.46 (11.66) 
  No. of Trades 11.90 (11.06) 12.08 (11.33) 12.18 (11.49) 12.31 (11.65) 12.64 (11.94) 
Depth Volatility 610.11 (624.61) 567.21 (586.19) 552.72 (570.12) 544.95 (559.87) 504.56 (522.77) 
  Volume 591.83 (605.40) 569.92 (586.54) 554.84 (575.19) 536.49 (549.41) 513.16 (523.09) 
  No. of Trades 597.70 (612.58) 569.28 (585.14) 552.09 (565.7) 531.09 (542.65) 495.64 (503.71) 
London  
Spread Volatility 15.60 (14.26) 16.67 (15.22) 17.59 (16.32) 19.04 (17.67) 21.84 (20.24) 
  Volume 18.22 (16.92) 18.54 (17.22) 18.51 (17.19) 18.71 (17.31) 18.95 (17.11) 
  No. of Trades 18.43 (17.05) 18.63 (17.32) 18.91 (17.23) 18.83 (17.23) 18.83 (17.23) 
Depth Volatility 25.66 (25.41) 24.59 (24.55) 24.40 (24.46) 24.22 (24.36) 24.18 (24.16) 
  Volume 24.22 (24.26) 23.98 (24.10) 24.00 (23.86) 24.27 (24.32) 24.49 (24.88) 
  No. of Trades 24.30 (24.32) 24.08 (24.28) 24.03 (24.18) 24.01 (24.18) 24.01 (24.18) 
Paris 
Spread Volatility 12.24 (11.28) 13.24 (12.19) 13.84 (12.76) 14.45 (13.32) 15.67 (14.25) 
  Volume 14.01 (12.91) 14.07 (12.92) 14.13 (12.92) 14.21 (12.93) 14.36 (12.82) 
  No. of Trades 14.04 (12.88) 14.14 (12.92) 14.28 (12.95) 14.45 (12.93) 14.45 (12.93) 
Depth Volatility 71.01 (71.08) 70.04 (69.84) 69.60 (69.39) 68.91 (68.82) 67.52 (67.29) 
  Volume 69.42 (69.25) 69.35 (69.23) 69.22 (69.35) 69.37 (69.24) 70.28 (69.90) 
  No. of Trades 69.48 (69.39) 69.56 (69.53) 69.45 (69.45) 69.73 (69.15) 69.73 (69.15) 
Spread refers to percentage quoted bid-ask spread. Depth is calculated from the average of bids plus asks per 5-minute interval. Intraday volatility 
is estimated from 5-minute absolute returns. Volume and number of trades refer to the average traded volume and the transaction frequency per 5-
minute interval. Figures are estimated per day and subsequently aggregated across days. Put contracts are in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Determinants of the quoted bid-ask spread 
  Amsterdam London Paris 
  Call Put Call Put Call Put 
Volt 0.15 0.12 0.36 0.28 0.49 0.36 
 (15.04)*** (12.79)*** (12.10)*** (7.83)*** (19.84)*** (11.07)*** 
Vlm 0.10 -1.36E-02 -0.21 -0.33 -0.58 -1.74 
 (3.25)*** (-0.47) (-3.61)*** (-5.16)*** (-3.21)*** (-9.66)*** 
Tr 0.03 -2.65E-03 8.28E-03 -0.08 2.36E-03 -0.07 
 (3.70)*** (-0.37) (0.31) (-3.07)*** (0.10) (-2.67)*** 
TTM -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 
 (-26.73)*** (-28.39)*** (-9.14)*** (-12.01)*** (-11.03)*** (-12.64)*** 
Mon -71.81 67.91 -78.72 101.30 -78.29 106.90 
 (-43.83)*** (41.00)*** (-12.53)*** (14.17)*** (-15.78)*** (18.78)*** 
Dur 5.04E-04 8.12E-04 8.29E-04 5.62E-04 4.20E-05 1.64E-04 
 (2.52)** (5.21)*** (3.97)*** (2.74)*** (0.25) (0.88) 
Lags 1-6 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 73.43 -65.45 82.05 -97.43 85.30 -93.69 
 (44.14)*** (-39.27)*** (13.30)*** (-13.53)*** (17.97)*** (-16.74)*** 
Adj-R2 0.76 0.76 0.80 0.81 0.53 0.53 
The dependent variable is PBAS which refers to percentage quoted bid-ask spread. Intraday volatility (Volt) is estimated 
from 5-minute absolute returns. Vlm and Tr refer to the natural logarithm of the average quoted volume and the 
transaction frequency per 5-minute interval. TTM and Mon are exogenous variables that refer to time-to-maturity in 
days and moneyness respectively. Dur refers to duration that is measured in minutes and refers to the average time 
between trades. Each equation is estimated using OLS and Newey-West standard errors are reported. T-statistics in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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 Table 4 
Macroeconomic announcement type and time (GMT) 
Announcement Dummy Amsterdam London Paris 
Country-specific 
CPI CPICo 08:30 09:30 . 
GDP GDPCo 08:30 09:30 . 
Unemployment rate UnRateCo 08:30 09:30 . 
Trade Balance TrBalCo 08:30 09:30 . 
European Union 
Interest Rate IntRateEU 12:45 12:45 12:45 
CPI CPIEU 10:00 10:00 10:00 
GDP GDPEU 10:00 10:00 10:00 
Industrial Production IndProdEU 10:00 10:00 10:00 
M3  M3 09:00 09:00 09:00 
Trade Balance TrBalEU 10:00 10:00 10:00 
Unemployment rate UnRateEU 10:00 10:00 10:00 
US 
CPI CPIUS 13:30 13:30 13:30 
GDP GDPUS 13:30 13:30 13:30 
Industrial Production IndProdUS 14:15 14:15 14:15 
Leading indicators Lead 15:00 15:00 15:00 
Trade Balance TrBalUS 13:30 13:30 13:30 
Unemployment rate UnRateUS 13:30 13:30 13:30 
US opening time  US open 13:30 13:30 13:30 
CPI refers to Consumer Price Index and GDP is Gross Domestic Product. M3 refers to money supply for 
the European Union. Interest rate refers to the ECB interest rate announcements. Leading indicators 
refers to an index that is designed to track the performance of the US economy. All announcements are 
downloaded from Bloomberg. We used Bloomberg’s relevance index to identify the most important 
macroeconomic announcements. For Paris, all macroeconomic announcements are made before the 
market opens.  
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Table 5 
Macroeconomic events  
  Amsterdam London Paris 
  Call Put Call Put Call Put 
CPICo -0.51 0.05 2.02 2.29 
    (-1.30) (0.16) (1.13) (2.17)** 
  GDPCo -0.34 0.10 4.03 1.57 
    (-1.24) (0.48) (3.87)*** (1.13) 
  UnRateCo -0.70 -0.78 1.80 1.25 
    (-3.63)*** (-4.80)*** (1.29) (0.77) 
  TrBalCo -0.52 -0.58 1.39 -0.67 
    (-2.08)** (-2.92)*** (1.09) (-1.00) 
  IntRate 0.16 0.57 -0.81 -0.23 1.08 -0.99 
  (0.37) (1.71)* (-4.25)*** (-0.51) (18.82)*** (-1.83)* 
CPIEU 0.76 0.76 5.85 2.69 6.49 5.94 
  (2.70)*** (2.57)** (2.56)** (1.41) (3.19)*** (1.42) 
GDPEU 0.57 0.51 3.71 -0.32 1.31 -0.61 
  (1.81)* (1.83)* (1.48) (-0.55) (0.64) (-1.16) 
InProdEU 0.46 0.66 4.31 2.12 4.35 3.63 
  (2.00)** (2.57)** (2.60)*** (1.59) (1.87)* (1.89)* 
M3 -0.36 -0.20 -0.35 0.61 1.32 0.40 
  (-1.97)** (-1.22) (-1.11) (1.06) (0.95) (1.61) 
TrBalEU 0.80 0.70 1.53 1.12 0.37 0.52 
  (2.99)*** (2.81)*** (1.66)* (1.28) (0.32) (0.24) 
UnRateEU 0.52 0.32 1.92 2.62 2.79 2.78 
  (1.37) (1.13) (1.09) (2.16)** (1.39) (1.18) 
CPIUS 1.68 1.93 9.32 3.95 2.28 2.04 
  (5.22)*** (6.00)*** (5.99)*** (2.17)** (0.81) (3.78)*** 
GDPUS 2.65 2.48 7.99 4.98 2.62 3.04 
  (7.23)*** (7.16)*** (2.97)*** (4.66)*** (2.25)** (3.35)*** 
InProdUS 1.43 1.79 1.06 4.67 2.77 4.44 
  (5.92)*** (7.19)*** (1.21) (1.54) (2.06)** (2.17)** 
Lead 2.92 2.53 7.22 3.99 5.94 6.84 
  (10.16)*** (8.00)*** (4.65)*** (4.16)*** (3.52)*** (2.83)*** 
TrBalUS 1.16 0.72 1.36 5.72 -1.73 -1.02 
  (1.66)* (1.10) (0.42) (5.30)*** (-1.41) (-0.62) 
UnRateUS 0.78 0.26 6.67 1.98 3.95 -1.42 
  (1.20) (0.43) (3.15)*** (0.76) (1.74)* (-0.92) 
US Open 2.16 2.02 4.78 4.03 4.43 3.89 
  (20.05)*** (18.29)*** (9.60)*** (7.73)*** (10.05)*** (10.34)*** 
Lags 1-6 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 71.11 -63.27 73.32 -91.50 80.01 -87.77 
  (43.35)*** (-38.25)*** (12.27)*** (-12.83)*** (17.12)*** (-16.07)*** 
Adj-R2 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.55 0.55 
CPI refers to Consumer Price Index and GDP is Gross Domestic Product. UnRate, TrBal, IntRate and InProd refer to the unemployment rate, 
trade balance, interest rate and industrial production respectively. Leading indicators (Lead) refers to an index that is designed to track the 
performance of the US economy. All announcements are downloaded from Bloomberg. We used Bloomberg’s relevance index to identify the 
most important macroeconomic announcements. For Paris, all macroeconomic announcements are made before market opens. US open refers 
to the US equity market opening time. Each equation is estimated using OLS and Newey-West standard errors are reported. T-statistics in 
parentheses. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Macroeconomic events: Spill over effects  
  Amsterdam London Paris 
  Call Put Call Put Call Put 
CPICo, Lon 0.62 0.51 
  
4.97 4.93 
  (2.56)** (2.41)** 
  
(2.14)** (1.43) 
GDPCo, Lon 0.74 0.47 
  
4.74 4.14 
  (2.44)** (1.80)* 
  
(2.46)** (2.01)** 
UnRateCo, Lon 0.37 0.30 
  
5.92 1.72 
  (1.62) (1.28) 
  
(1.54) (0.81) 
TrBalCo, Lon -0.02 0.04 
  
1.52 -0.78 
  (-0.06) (0.19) 
  
(0.90) (-3.60)*** 
CPICo, Ams 
  
-1.09 3.30 -0.49 -0.98 
  
  
(-1.35) (1.53) (-0.84) (-2.08)** 
GDPCo, Ams 
  
0.53 0.88 0.08 -0.87 
  
  
(0.69) (0.57) (0.13) (-1.71)* 
UnRateCo, Ams 
  
-0.93 -0.20 -1.73 -0.61 
  
  
(-1.84)* (-0.44) (-1.18) (-1.08) 
TrBalCo, Ams 
  
-1.09 -2.69 -2.36 -1.33 
  
  
(-1.65)* (-2.69)*** (-1.55) (-2.00)** 
Lags 1-6 YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Macro Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Constant 70.81 -62.90 73.50 -94.23 82.20 -98.33 
  (42.73)*** (-38.83)*** (12.29)*** (-13.30)*** (17.71)*** (-17.70)*** 
Adjusted R2 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.82 0.55 0.55 
CPI refers to Consumer Price Index and GDP is Gross Domestic Product. UnRate and TrBal refer to the unemployment rate 
and trade balance respectively. The subscripts Lon and Ams refer to London and Amsterdam respectively. For Paris, all 
country-specific macroeconomic announcements are made before the market opens. US open refers to the US equity market 
opening time. Each equation is estimated using OLS and Newey-West standard errors are reported. T-statistics in parentheses. 
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1 
Intraday variation of standardized quoted bid-ask spread 
 
 
 
Spread refers to the percentage quoted bid-ask spread measured at 5-minute intervals. Each bar denotes the estimated coefficient of Equation 
(). In total there are 101-minute intervals during a day, however we drop the interval at the middle of the day (12:00-12:05) which is 
captured by the constant. When presenting the results, the coefficient for each intraday interval is the sum of the regression coefficient for 
that interval and the constant, therefore we drop the constant from the tables. Equation (6) is estimated with the Newey-West correction for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Shaded bars denote a significant coefficient at the 5% level.  
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Figure 2 
Intraday variation of standardized depth 
 
 
 
Depth refers to the sum of ask and bid volume, sampled at 5-minute intervals. Each bar denotes the estimated coefficient of Equation (6). In 
total there are 101-minute intervals during a day, however we drop the interval at the middle of the day (12:00-12:05) which is captured by 
the constant. When presenting the results, the coefficient for each intraday interval is the sum of the regression coefficient for that interval 
and the constant, therefore we drop the constant from the tables. Equation (7) is estimated using the Newey-West correction for 
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Shaded bars denote a significant coefficient at the 5% level.  
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Figure 3 
Intraday variation of standardized volatility 
 
 
 
Volatility refers to the absolute value of 5-minute returns. Each bar denotes the estimated coefficient of Equation (7). In total there are 101-
minute intervals during a day, however we drop the interval at the middle of the day (12:00-12:05) which is captured by the constant. When 
presenting the results, the coefficient for each intraday interval is the sum of the regression coefficient for that interval and the constant, 
therefore we drop the constant from the tables. Equation (7) is estimated using the Newey-West correction for autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity. Shaded bars denote a significant coefficient at the 5% level.  
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Figure 4 
Shock duration 
 
In this figure, we describe the process of comparing the real PBAS with the expected PBAS as it is predicted by an 
autoregressive equation after controlling for the macroeconomic shocks. A detailed explanation is provided in Section 5.1.2 
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Figure 5 
Shock duration: empirical results 
  
  
  
In this figure, we show how long it takes for the percentage bid-ask spread to revert back to its “normal” levels following macroeconomic shocks. The vertical axis refers to PBAS and the horizontal axis to time, 
measured in minutes. Country, Euro and US refer to country-, Euro- and US-specific macro announcements respectively. US open refers to the US equity market opening time. 
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Figure 6 
Systematic liquidity 
 
 
 
Systematic liquidity refers to the proportion of variance explained by the first principal factor. The description 
of how the principal component is extracted separately for each market and contract type is described in 
Section 5.2. 
 
 
